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ABSTRACT
Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) are recollections of personal past that frequently
and spontaneously occur in daily life. Initial studies by Mace (2005) showed that deliberately
reminiscing about a certain lifetime period (e.g., high school) significantly increased the
number of different IAMs from the same period in subsequent days, suggesting that priming
may play a significant role in the retrieval of IAMs in everyday life. In the present study, we
used a modified experimental paradigm, originally used by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili
(2008), to study IAMs under well-controlled laboratory conditions. Participants completed a
monotonous vigilance task twice and reported the occurrence of any spontaneous thoughts
that were later classed as IAMs or other thoughts. Priming was manipulated by having
experimental participants reminiscing about high school period between the two vigilance
tasks and control participants playing simple games. Results showed that participants in the
experimental group reported IAMs relating to high school period more frequently during the
second vigilance task than those in the control group. In the experimental group, the
number of high school memories was marginally higher in the second vigilance task
compared to the first vigilance task with the medium effect size, but this within subjects
effect was not significant in the control group. Finally, priming also enhanced the retrieval of
more remote IAMs in the experimental group compared to the control group. These results
suggest that priming may play a significant role in the activation and recall of IAMs and open
up interesting avenues for future research.
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The ability to remember our personal past is called auto-
biographical memory (for more contemporary review see
Berntsen & Rubin, 2012; for clinical perspective see also,
Watson & Bernsten, 2015). We use it every time when we
want to recall something that we personally did or experi-
enced in the past. For example, we may try to recall our last
day in a high school. These memories are also called volun-
tary autobiographical memories. They result from the
intention to recall something and typically involve an
effortful search (Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016; Botzung,
Denkova, Ciuciu, Scheiber, & Manning, 2008). On the
other hand, involuntary autobiographical memories
(IAMs) are recollections of personal past that simply
come to our mind without any conscious intention at
retrieval (Berntsen, 2010; Mace, 2007). Recent studies
suggest that this type of involuntary remembering may
be even more frequently experienced in daily life com-
pared to voluntary and effortful retrieval (e.g., Rasmussen
& Berntsen, 2011; Uzer, Lee, & Brown, 2012).
Since the involuntary retrieval is most likely to happen
when an individual is engaged in an automatic activity
with low attention demands (Berntsen, 1996), they
appear to be retrieved effortlessly in a non-strategic way
(e.g., Uzer et al., 2012). For instance, we may experience
IAMs while driving home or washing dishes. While IAMs
are presumed to be retrieved automatically, little is
known about their underlying mechanisms (e.g., basic
priming dependency or cognitive load dependency).
More specifically, we may ask “how” IAMs come to mind
and “why” they are related to this particular event from
our personal past. While answering the “how” question,
researchers are mainly interested in variables that may
modify the frequency of IAMs retrieval. For example,
while addressing the question about the effects of cogni-
tive load on IAMs, Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski,
Mazzoni, and Paccani (2015) showed that the occurrence
of IAMs was substantially limited by the high level of cog-
nitive demand of the ongoing mental activity. At the same
time, the “why” question addresses mainly effects of
priming on IAMs (e.g., Mace, 2005). For instance, we may
ask, why a few days after running into a long-unseen
friend from high school we are suddenly flooded by mem-
ories related to high-school period. This also raises the
question of whether IAMs are “simply randomly triggered
through the random experience of cues” (p. 875; Mace,
2005), or are organised by some cognitive processes.
Although there is a growing body of research investigating
priming effects on IAMs (e.g., Ball & Hennessey, 2009; Mace
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& Clevinger, 2013; Mace, Clevinger, & Bernas, 2013), to the
best of the authors’ knowledge, there is only one study that
addressed directly the effects of priming on IAMs (Mace,
2005).
It is worth highlighting that the questions concerning
cognitive mechanisms of IAMs may be considered as one
of the most important issues in relation to understanding
IAMs (Berntsen, 2009, p. 86), especially given that involun-
tary memory processes may play an important role in
emotion regulation (e.g., Gross, 2001) and mental dis-
orders, such as dysphoric mood (e.g., Kvavilashvili &
Schlagman, 2011), posttraumatic stress disorder (Berntsen,
2015) or depression (Moulds & Krans, 2015). Therefore,
developing our knowledge about IAMs may contribute to
gaining an insight into human cognition in everyday life,
and even more importantly, in clinical disorders. For
example, as pointed out by Berntsen (2015), mechanisms
that govern the retrieval of everyday IAMs may be
especially helpful in explaining the phenomenon of recur-
rent intrusive remembering of traumatic events.
Effects of priming on IAMs
According to the self-memory system model proposed by
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), autobiographical
memory consists of a hierarchical network of intercon-
nected nodes. Very specific and concrete information
with sensory details (e.g., swimming in the Atlantic Ocean
for the first time) are stored at the bottom of the network.
They are further connected to super-ordinate levels of
general events (e.g., swimming in the oceans), common
themes (swimming, doing sports), or even, at the highest
level of memory nodes, important periods in one’s life
(e.g., when I was young). The nodes can be linked to each
other in various ways. For example, by activating more
general levels (working in Portugal for one year), we may
gain access to a specific memory of a particular event
(swimming in the Ocean the day I visited Porto). This acti-
vation may spread across the network horizontally and ver-
tically (i.e., upwards) and, most importantly, it is basically
launched by different types of cues (i.e., internal or exter-
nal) that play a crucial role in the retrieval of an autobiogra-
phical memory content. Therefore, examining the
relationship between particular cues and memories may
be helpful in answering the question of why a certain
memory has just come to one’s mind.
It can be argued that the issue of “why” IAMs relate to
some particular event pertains to a broader question.
Namely, given that IAMs occur automatically in response
to incidental external and internal cues, why are we not
flooded by the same memories in response to the same
cues? One might expect to always retrieve the same invo-
luntary memory in response to a distinct cue, for example,
a red pen. This might be especially true if there is only one
event that maps perfectly onto such distinct trigger.
However, it is more likely that cues usually do not exclu-
sively match only to one memory. According to the
principle of cue overload, it is most likely that a cue will
match several past events (Berntsen, 2009). Elaborating it
further, Berntsen (2009) suggests that the more events
are associated with a particular cue, the less efficient this
cue will be in triggering any of them. Discussing this
phenomenon, Berntsen (2009) introduced the so-called
cue-item discriminability, which can be defined as “how
easily a given cue isolates an item” (Rubin, 1995, p. 151
as cited in Berntsen, 2009, p. 107). Berntsen, Staugaard,
and Sørensen (2013) carefully examined the relationship
between cue and memory in their pioneering work in
which, for the first time, they were able to predict the
occurrence of an involuntary episodic memory based on
the manipulation at encoding. Across four experiments
they found that involuntary episodic memories were
retrieved more often in response to unique compared to
repeated (i.e., associated with many memories) cues,
which accords well with the principle of the cue-overload.
The more unique the association between the cue and a
given memory was, the more likely the triggering of the
memory was. However, it can be argued that the cues
that are very unique and distinctively related to a given
memory target are rather rare in daily life and most cues
map onto many different memories and events. Yet, such
cues still seem to easily trigger IAMs. Therefore, it is reason-
able to ask what processes may increase cue-item discri-
minability that allows for efficient activation of a
particular involuntary memory. Put differently, what kind
of process makes an ordinary cue capable of bringing a
certain IAM to mind?
Addressing this question, Mace (2005) proposed
priming as one possible cognitive process that could con-
tribute to the formation of IAMs (for a review of priming
processes, see also Anderson & Bower, 1974; Roediger &
McDermott, 1993). For example, thinking about the long-
unseen friend from high-school can prime a number of
autobiographical memories that refer to each other
either thematically (e.g., previous joint activities) or tem-
porally (different events from the same lifetime period).
Importantly, priming mechanism perfectly addresses the
cue overload principle. More specifically, the activation of
a particular part of autobiographical knowledge base
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), for example, a high
school lifetime period, narrows the pool of possible mem-
ories that can be potentially elicited in response to a certain
cue. Thus, priming may increase the cue-item discriminabil-
ity and, for some memories, boost the likelihood that
memory will enter a person’s awareness. In the example
described, it will be more likely that memories relating to
the high school period would be elicited when a relevant
cue appears. In addition, priming may activate not only
memories relating to the high school period (e.g., being
between 16 and 19 years old), but also memories relating
to more distant past (e.g., going to the primary school).
The retrieval of the past may per se facilitate the retrieval
of many different nodes and levels associated with the acti-
vated part of autobiographical knowledge base. In other
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words, retrieving a certain memory from the past may
cause spreading activation across the nodes in the
network that are closely associated with retrieved
memory either temporally or thematically. As a result,
someone who has been reminiscing about the past
should be more prone to involuntarily retrieve memories
from more distant rather than recent past.
Mace (2005) considered voluntary remembering to be
the most likely way of priming IAMs and proposed two
effects that voluntary remembering may have on IAMs.
First, remembering the past voluntarily may cause
spreading activation to occur throughout the network
of memories. As a result, some involuntary high school
memories may simply pop in our mind just after or
even during the voluntary remembering. Some of them
may also occur any time later. For instance, memories
about the high school crush may start entering a
person’s awareness a few hours or even days after
running into a long-unseen friend. Second, some mem-
ories may not enter awareness because they were too
weakly activated. However, it is likely that these weakly
activated memories may be later favoured by the invo-
luntary memory retrieval especially because their acti-
vation level would be higher compared to memories
that were not activated at all. To put it differently, there
is a greater chance of eliciting a weakly activated
memory compared to non-activated ones. Thus, the
priming effect should directly or indirectly narrow the
field of memories that could be potentially elicited.
A series of studies published by Mace (2005) addressed
the role of priming in the retrieval of IAMs. For example, in
Study 1, after recording IAMs in a structured diary for 14
days, participants were inquired about being preoccupied
with any thoughts (e.g., themes such as problems at work)
during the preceding period of time. The findings showed
a high correlation between the life-theme thoughts and
IAMs relating to those mental contents. For instance,
someone preoccupied with thoughts about his/her
partner, was more likely to report IAMs relating to such
theme. However, since causal inferences could not be
drawn, Mace (2005) conducted two more studies with an
experimental manipulation. In Study 2, participants also
recorded IAMs in a structured diary, but they were
primed during that period in the laboratory with voluntary
reminiscing session (recalling episodes from high school
for 30-minutes). Mace observed higher frequency of
high-school IAMs after voluntary recall of memories per-
taining to high school. Study 3 replicated and extended
the priming effects of Study 2 using two different and
more generic lifetime periods, namely, participants recalled
events from the previous year or from when they were
aged 13–16. In line with the results of Study 2, participants
experienced more memories relating either to the past
year or ages between 13 and 16, depending on the
manipulation used.
The findings lend strong support to the idea that
priming plays an important part in the occurrence of
IAMs. By engaging participants in voluntary reminiscing,
Mace provided the first evidence that IAMs depend, to
some extent, on priming, and their frequency can be modi-
fied by voluntary retrieval. In addition, since IAMs were not
direct repetitions of memories recorded in the laboratory, it
implies an associative type of IAM priming. Put differently,
an individual may more often experience an IAM relating
temporally or thematically to previously recalled lifetime
period rather than an exact repetition of memory
content retrieved in the laboratory (Study 2 and Study 3).
The present study
Mace’s (2005) study clearly demonstrated that the occur-
rence of IAMs may rely on priming mechanism. However,
it is important to highlight that since these studies were
conducted using a naturalistic diary method, there is still
a need for further research so that Mace’s initial findings
can be replicated with more experimentally oriented
approach. Therefore, the overriding goal of the present
study was to empirically verify the role of priming in invo-
luntary retrieval in the lab. More precisely, we wanted to
investigate the effect of voluntary reminiscing about the
past on the content and temporal orientation of IAMs. To
fulfil this goal, we modified an often-used experimental
procedure, developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili
(2008), that allows studying IAMs under well-controlled
conditions (e.g., Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016; Barzy-
kowski & Staugaard, 2016; Plimpton, Patel, & Kvavilashvili,
2015; Vannucci et al., 2015). In Schlagman and Kvavilashvi-
li’s original procedure, participants are instructed to
perform a monotonous vigilance task that consists of infre-
quent target slides (n = 15) with vertical lines in a stream of
785 slides with patterns of horizontal lines. In addition, on
each trial, short verbal phrases are presented in the centre
of the screen, some of which may trigger IAMs. Participants
have to interrupt the vigilance task every time they experi-
ence such a memory.
We used several modifications, which are explained in
detail in the methods section below. However, the most
important differences between our modified procedure
and the original method by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili
(2008) involved (1) engaging participants in two phases
of the vigilance task with the same set of 400 cues
(phase 1 and phase 2),1 (2) instructing them to record
any spontaneously occurring thoughts during the task,
and 3) at the completion of phase 2, asking participants
to indicate which of the recorded thoughts were memories
(for similar instructions, see Barzykowski et al., 2016; Barzy-
kowski & Staugaard, 2016). With regard to the first modifi-
cation, we decided to use two IAM collecting phases to
examine the direct effect of voluntary reminiscing about
the past on IAM retrieval.
Second, we carefully controlled the risk of participants
entering into the retrieval mode during the vigilance task
(Tulving, 1983), in which “the cognitive system is prepared
for or expects memory construction and recollection”
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(Conway, 2001, p. 1379). Aswewanted tominimise intention-
ality during retrieval (Barzykowski et al., 2016; Vannucci,
Batool, Pelagatti, Mazzoni, & Dekel, 2014) and to maximise
involuntary retrieval (Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016), partici-
pants were instructed to report any spontaneously occurring
thoughts. This procedure allowedus tominimise the chances
that IAMs collected during the vigilance taskswere produced
by intentional recall (Barzykowski et al., 2016). In addition,
due to the fact that participants were not exclusively
focused on writing down only IAMs, it is rather unlikely that
theyweremorewilling to retrieve IAMs related to the lifetime
period that was a theme of voluntary retrieval.
In general, the procedure consisted of three parts: (1)
the first IAM collecting phase (before the manipulation),
(2) experimental manipulation that involved the voluntary
reminiscence session (only in the high school group) and a
filler task (in both the high school group and the control
group), (3) the second IAM collecting phase (after the
experimental manipulation). Participants from the exper-
imental (the high school) group were primed with the
voluntary reminiscence session that involved recalling epi-
sodes from high school for 15 min2 between the first and
the second IAM collecting phase. By using this design,
we were able to manipulate the priming between- and
within-subjects. It is worth to underline that in order to
investigate the temporal orientation of primed memories,
we used one lifetime period for priming: high school.
When, after the priming session, one is looking only for
memories that are exclusively related to a certain type of
school (e.g., “I suddenly remembered the time in my high
school French class when”, Mace, 2005, p. 879), this limits
the examination of the priming effect only to specific
memories thematically related to the school. We believe
that the effect of priming may be more general, that is,
priming may generally increase the frequency of experien-
cing memories from the primed period of the personal
past. We thus expected that priming would boost not
only retrieval of memories thematically related to the
school that was a theme of the voluntary memory record-
ing session (e.g., the time in my English class when I acci-
dently forced the door), but, in general, also memories
from this lifetime period (e.g., I suddenly remembered
going to the Baltic Sea Cost when I attended high school).
For that reason, in our study, participants were asked to
identify the temporal context of each collected involuntary
memory, no matter whether they were or were not thema-
tically related to the high school. We expected to observe
higher frequency of memories from the period of time
that was retrieved during the voluntary memory recording
phase. To put it differently, participants should be
immersed more into their past after deliberately reminis-
cing about it compared to participants who did not pre-
viously record their past at all.3
Finally, we wanted to examine the priming effect in the
laboratory while overcoming some limitations of a diary
method that is mainly the lack of systematic control over
a wide variety of independent (e.g., type of cues, the
ongoing activity during the memory retrieval) and depen-
dent variables (e.g., retrieval times of IAMs). Importantly, in
experimental settings, compared to diary methods, all par-
ticipants are studied under exactly the same conditions.
For example, by providing participants with standardised
sets of cues with precise control over their number,
emotional valence and presentation time, we were able
to analyse more directly the relationship between the
priming effects, triggers and IAMs. However, probably the
biggest advantage of the experimental design is that it
allows to directly examine the retrieval of IAMs. Therefore,
by fully controlling the presentation of triggers and the
time at which IAMs are reported, we are able to measure
and analyse the retrieval times (RT) for the subset of
IAMs triggered by the verbal cues. Taking all these
together, we argue therefore that employing the exper-
imental design in the present study can allow to further
improve our knowledge about priming effects compared
to the procedure used by Mace (2005).
In line with Mace (2005), in the present study, the
dependent variable was the proportion of IAMs related
to a certain period of time (e.g., high school) out of a
total number of memories reported by a participant.
Such an involuntary memory density index (henceforth
called also an IMD index) was calculated for each lifetime
period: before kindergarten, kindergarten, primary school,
middle school, high school, college, time after college. In
addition, we calculated remote past IMD index that is the
proportion of all memories that come from lifetime
periods before the college time (before kindergarten, kin-
dergarten, primary school, middle school, high school)
out of a total number of all memories reported by a
given participant. Since we conducted the present study
only with undergraduate students, all periods before the
college time relate to the participant’s relatively remote
past compared to the college time. It allowed us to
examine the tendency to involuntarily retrieve remote
past. The higher the IMD index, the higher the proportion
of memories with certain characteristics in the total
number of all reported memories.
Hypotheses
In general, we expected that voluntary reminiscing about
the high school period in the experimental condition
should enhance the retrieval of IAMs from this lifetime
period. More precisely, in the second IAM collecting
phase (i.e., after voluntary reminiscence session) we
should observe higher IMD index relating to the period
of high school in the high school group compared to the
control condition (between subjects differences). Impor-
tantly, for the high school group, this index should also
be higher in the second phase compared to the first one
(within-subject differences). In addition, given that IAMs
typically refer to recent period of time (e.g., Berntsen,
1996; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Vannucci et al., 2014) and
assuming that voluntarily reminiscing about the past
truly activates IAMs from more distant past, the within-
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subject effect (i.e., difference between the first and the
second phase in the high school group) and between-
subject effect (difference between groups in the second
phase), described above, should also be observed for the
remote past IMD index and the age of recorded memories.
Method
The Research Ethics Committee approved the usage of the
experimental method adapted from Schlagman and Kvavi-
lashvili (2008). Written consent for participation was
obtained prior to data collection.
Design
The mixed subject design was employed in the present
study. We manipulated lifetime period that was retrieved
just before the second involuntary memory collecting
phase (between-subject factor: high school group vs.
control group) and measured IMD indexes twice (within-
subject factor: first vs. second involuntary memory
collecting phase). We used one lifetime period that was
voluntarily retrieved by participants, that is, high school.
It allowed us to compare the high school condition with
a control group where participants were not engaged in
the voluntary retrieval at all.
Participants
A total of 60 participants (39 females, Mage = 22.14, SD =
2.27, range 19–31 years, all but six participant were under-
graduate students) were recruited and randomly assigned
to the two experimental conditions: the control group and
the high school group. They were all screened for
depression using the Polish version of the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI) (Parnowski & Jermajczyk, 1977). Since
various mental disorders may affect retrieval of IAMs
(e.g., depression, Moulds & Krans, 2015; Watson, Berntsen,
Kuyken, & Watkins, 2013), we excluded from the sample
four participants who scored 20 or above. Therefore, the
final sample consisted of 27 participants in the control con-
dition (17 females, Mage = 22.37, SD = 2.31, range 19–27
years) and 29 participants in the high school condition
(18 females, Mage = 22.20, SD = 2.36, range 20–31 years).
Students participated in return for a gift card worth
around 20 PLN (c.a. 5$ USD).
Materials
In the present study, we used the Involuntary Memory
Program (IMP) that consisted of two IAM collecting
phases separated by the voluntary memory recording
phase. In addition, participants from both groups per-
formed the filler task just before the second IAM collecting
phase.
Involuntary memory program
We employed the IMP that is described elsewhere in more
detail (e.g., Barzykowski et al., 2016, pp. 5–6; also, Barzy-
kowski & Staugaard, 2016, p. 524). This fully computerised
experimental procedure was adapted from the method
originally developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili
(2008). The main differences between the present task
and Schlagman and Kvavilashvili’s (2008) original design
were as follows: (1) use of a computerised version for all
questions, (2) providing participants with 400 slides
twice, (3) randomly ordering the trials and cues for each
participant, (4) extending the presentation of each trial
from 1.5 to 2 s, and (5) instructing participants to write
down any involuntarily occurring thoughts.
The vigilance task involved detecting patterns of verti-
cal lines (8 target slides) in a stream of 392 non-target
slides with horizontal lines. Each slide was presented for
2 s during each separate trial. In addition, short verbal
phrases (e.g., riding a horse, listening to the concert) were
displayed on each slide in the centre of the screen. There
were an approximately equal number of neutral (N =
134), positive (N = 133), and negative (N = 133) phrases,4
that constituted the final pool of 400 phrases randomly
selected for each participant from the pool of 800
phrases used in previous studies (e.g., Barzykowski et al.,
2016; Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016). Participants first
completed two practice sessions that consisted of 25
trials each (there was only one pattern of vertical lines pre-
sented) and which displayed verbal phrases in the same
fixed order for each participant. Following these practice
trials, the main vigilance task began that consisted of 400
slides and phrases randomly generated for each partici-
pant. The second IAM collecting phase was the same
(including the order of the cues) as the first phase.5
Voluntary memory recording phase
High school condition. The voluntary remembering phase
was built into the IMP (for more details see below) and
was launched between the first and second IAM collecting
phase. It took around 12–15 min and consisted of open-
ended and close-ended questions. They were aimed at
activating as broadly as possible the part of autobiographi-
cal memory knowledge base that relates to the high school
lifetime period (between 16 and 19 years old). These ques-
tions concerned: (1) A name of the school that the partici-
pant attended, (2) the range of age while being in the
school (1 = 13–16, 2 = 16–19), (3) the educator’s name and
(4) her or his subject, (5) the extent to which the participant
liked attending the subject (1 = I didn’t like it at all, 2 = I
didn’t like it, 3 = I don’t think I liked it, 4 = It was neutral to
me, 5 = I liked it somewhat, 6 = I liked it, 7 = I liked it a lot),
(6) the extent to which this subject was interesting (1 = It
wasn’t interesting at all, 2 = It wasn’t interesting, 3 = I don’t
think it was interesting, 4 = It was neutral to me, 5 = It was
somewhat interesting, 6 = It was interesting, 7 = It was very
interesting), (7) the name of the favourite teacher and (8)
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his or her subject, (9) the extent to which the participant
liked attending this subject (1 = I didn’t like it at all, 2 = I
didn’t like it, 3 = I don’t think I liked it, 4 = It was neutral to
me, 5 = I liked it somewhat, 6 = I liked it, 7 = I liked it a lot).
Participants were then instructed to recall and name any
four events from the high school period (10). They were
also asked to choose one of those events and describe it
more thoroughly (11). In addition (12), they indicated
their grade (1 = grade 1; 2 = grade 2, 3 = grade 3), (13)
their age (1 = 13 years old, 2 = 14 years old, 3 = 15 years
old, 4 = 16 years old, 5 = 17 years old, 6 = 18 years old, 7 =
19 years old), (14) the intensity of emotions experienced
during the event (1 = not intense at all, 2 = not intense, 3
= rather not intense, 4 = slightly intense, 5 = somewhat
intense, 6 = intense, and 7 = very intense), (15) the emotional
valence of the original event (1 = very unpleasant, 2 = rather
unpleasant, 3 = unpleasant, 4 = neutral, 5 = rather pleasant,
6 = pleasant, 7 = very pleasant), (16) the time of year (1 =
spring, 2 = summer, 3 = autumn, 4 =winter), (17) the time
of week (1 =Working day, from Monday to Friday, 2 =
Weekend or non-working day) and (18) the time of day
when the event occurred (1 = Before noon, between 6 am
and 12, 2 = In the afternoon, between 12 and 6 pm, 3 = In
the evening, between 6 pm and 12 am, 4 = At night,
between 12 am and 6 am). Next, they were instructed to
recall and name any four of the most pleasant events
from the high school period (19). They chose one of
them and answered analogous questions as described
above (11–18). This procedure was repeated for recalling
and naming three most important events from the high
school period (20) and two most important achievements
from the high school period (21). In total, participants
answered 43 questions and recalled 13 specific events.
Filler tasks
After finishing the voluntary memory recording phase
(experimental condition) and before starting the second
IAM collecting phase (both conditions) participants
played a few games selected from CONCENTRATION
Part 2. Mind Academy software for 10 min (experimental
condition) or 20 min (control condition). These exercises
engage: ability to analyse stimuli and information, con-
structive problems solving, inductive and deductive
reasoning. They were set on a low level of difficulty
without time pressure. The material in the games was
rather abstract and non-verbal. Therefore, it is rather unli-
kely that it might have involuntarily or voluntarily triggered
any episodic or autobiographical memories from the per-
sonal past.
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of two to six. Just before
starting the first and second IAM collecting phase, they
filled in the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Brzozowski, 2010).6 Participants were informed
that they were free to withdraw from the study at any
point. In addition, the experimenter assured them that
their responses would be anonymous, and informed
them that they could refrain from reporting particularly
sensitive thoughts by typing “X” as an answer, or (if poss-
ible) by providing a general description of their thoughts
rather than a detailed account. At the beginning of the
session, the experimenter only briefly introduced the par-
ticipants to the procedure. They were informed that exper-
imental session would consist of three main parts. They
were told that the first part would examine how people
concentrate on monotonous and boring tasks. The task
was then described in more detail. It was explained that
since the study would examine how people concentrate
on monotonous vigilance task, the task would need to be
quite long and onerous. Participants were also told that
the condition they would be taking part in would have a
short break between the first and the second vigilance
task and that participants assigned to the other group
would also need to do the vigilance task twice but
without taking a break.
High school condition. Participants were then informed
that the break would last about 20 min and examined
how people remember the time when they were in high
school. They were assured that they would answer a
series of questions concerning their personal past and
experiences that related only to this period of time. In
addition, the filler task was also described as a part of
another study in which various games would be used. Par-
ticipants were told that in order to find the best game for
further studies, they would play each of the four games.
They responded to additional questions by rating on 7-
point scales the extent to which they found these games
difficult, funny, interesting. After finishing the filler task,
participants started the second IAM collecting phase.
Control condition. The only difference between the high
school condition and the control condition was that partici-
pants were not engaged in the voluntary memories record-
ing phase. They played games for 20 min (i.e., filler task)
before they started the second IAM collecting phase.
Involuntary memory collecting phase
As in the previous studies (e.g., Barzykowski et al., 2016;
Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016; Vannucci et al., 2014,
2015), participants were instructed to identify a vertical
pattern of lines by pressing a red button (“m” on the key-
board). In addition, they were informed that they would
also see word phrases in the centre of the screen. It was
explained that these word phrases were used in another
condition and they should not respond to them during
the current study. Next, participants were engaged in the
first practice session that required responding only to ver-
tical lines. They were then informed that during the com-
puter task they might experience different kinds of
thoughts, and they were provided with examples of such
thoughts, including personal goals, words, current con-
cerns, plans, and memories. However, no particular empha-
sis was put on memories during the briefing. Participants
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were only told that memories could be diverse (i.e., specific,
general) and pertain either to recent or remote past events.
The participants were asked to report any spontaneous
thoughts by pressing the spacebar as soon as they
became aware of them. Next, they performed the vigilance
task and if they experienced any involuntary thought, they
recorded them.7
After completing the second practice session, partici-
pants started the main vigilance task. Each time they
pressed the spacebar, they were asked to provide a brief
description of the content of their thoughts (by typing it
into the computer program). They also specified what trig-
gered the content (1 = Something in the program, 2 = Some-
thing in my mind, 3 = Something in the surroundings, 4 =
Nothing) and provided a brief description of the trigger.
In addition, due to the fact that participants performed
the IAM collecting phase twice, during the second phase
they also indicated whether the content was being
recorded the first (or more) time. It allowed us to control
the extent to which participants had been recording one
memory more than once. After answering these two
(phase 1) or three (phase 2) questions, participants
clicked “continue” to return to the vigilance task. On com-
pletion of the first IAM collecting phase, the program was
automatically stopped, and started the break that was
described above. After the break experimenter launched
the second IAM collecting phase.
At the completion of the vigilance task, participants
answered open-ended questions concerning what they
thought: (1) the true goal of the study was, (2) the true
goal of performing the computer program was, (3) the
study was about, (4) good performance during the study
was. In addition, they were asked what they did during
the study to perform well (5). They were then provided
with written and verbal instructions describing the nature
of autobiographical memory (as, for example, in Schlag-
man, Kliegel, Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, 2009, p. 410) and
were informed about the second part of the study.
During this part, participants reviewed all of their thoughts
recorded in the IAM collecting phases, one at a time and in
the same order as they had been recorded. Participants
were instructed to decide whether each thought was an
autobiographical memory or not by clicking the “start”
button (if it was) or the “next” button (if it was not). After
clicking the “start” button, they were asked to describe
the memory more thoroughly by typing it into the compu-
ter program and rated (on 7-point scale) the lifetime period
from to which the memory belongs (1 = before being in a
kindergarten, 2 =while being in the kindergarten, 3 =while
being in the primary school, 4 =while being in the middle
school, 5 =while being in the high school, 6 =while being
in the college, 7 = period after college). Wherever it was poss-
ible (i.e., for specific or general memories of events that an
individual experienced at a certain age), they also esti-
mated the age of the memory by indicating their age
when the event occurred. They also specified whether
the memory was general or specific by classifying an
event as: (1) extended in time (e.g., last week), (2) repeated
in the past (e.g., regular meetings), or (3) referring to a par-
ticular situation happening within 1 day (e.g., the day I met
X). Both 1 and 2 were then classified as general events,
while 3 was classified as specific events. At the completion
of the IMP, they filled in the BDI (Parnowski & Jermajczyk,
1977).
Results
For all statistical tests, reported below, the rejection level
was set at .05. None of the participants reported having
guessed the real purpose of the study.
Equivalence of study groups
To test the comparability of groups, the overall means for
the BDI were entered into independent t-test. The results
presented in Table 1 show that we did not observed any
significant differences between the groups, t(54) = .17, p
= .86, d = .05. Also, the overall means for the mood scores
as measured by PANAS were entered into two separate 2
(group: control, high school) × 2 (collecting phase: first
phase, second phase) mixed ANOVAs with repeated
measures on the last factor. The analysis revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of collecting phase on the positive, F(1,
54) = 16.88, p < .001, η2 = .24, and negative affect, F(1, 54)
= 10.88, p < .002, η2 = .17. More specifically, during the
second phase participants had lower ratings on positive
and negative affect scales compared to the first phase
(see Table 2). It is possible that performing a monotonous
vigilance task for the first time and additional cognitive
activities followed by the second IAM collecting phase
somehow settled participants down. Since they became
familiarised with the procedure, they might have felt less
nervous and stressed as well as less active and lively,
especially because the tasks were not too exciting and
challenging. However, neither the main effect of group,
nor the group by phase interaction were significant.
Finally, to control for the possible differences in the time-
line of the experiment, the overall means for the length
of the whole program duration (phase 1 plus the break
plus the voluntary memory recording phase in the high
school group8 plus phase 2) were entered into indepen-
dent t-test. The groups (high school: M = 47.25 min., SD =
15.81; control: M = 53.70 min., SD = 16.93) did not differ
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for variables measuring mood
across groups.
Group
High school Control
M SD M SD
Beck depression inventory 8.31 6.19 8.04 5.69
PANAS: Positive affect_1 46.21 7.96 48.26 8.24
PANAS: Positive affect_2 41.45 11.51 42.11 13.08
PANAS: Negative affect_1 21.34 8.13 18.41 3.46
PANAS: Negative affect_2 17.28 4.08 17.19 3.13
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significantly from each other in this regard, t(53) = 1.46, p
= .15, d = .39.
Strategy for data analysis
Only the entries that were classified by participants as
autobiographical memories were included in the analyses
reported below. In addition, all these entries were screened
by the independent judges as memories or non-memories.
All entries identified by participants as memories were
classified in the same way by judges. Examples of entries
identified by participants as non-memories were semantic
memories unrelated to the personal past (Smolensk plane
crash in 2011), semantic thoughts (lyrics, rhymes), future
plans (going to the cinema with friends this Friday), thoughts
relating to the current situation (what a boring task, I am
hungry). For all IAMs reported by participants as triggered
by a verbal phrase, we calculated RT, which was the time
between the moment when the individual indicated a
memory, and the onset of the verbal phrase which s/he
had indicated as the trigger of that memory. As in the pre-
vious studies on IAMs (Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016;
Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008),
since participants provided dependent multiple obser-
vations, we calculated mean RTs, IMD indexes, specificity
ratios and the age of memories for each participant. We
excluded outliers with a value of 2.5 SD or more above or
below the mean of the group.
Number of thoughts and IAMs
The mean number of involuntary thoughts and IAMs (see
also Table 2) were separately entered into a 2 (group:
control, high school) by 2 (collecting phase: first phase,
second phase) mixed ANOVAs with repeated measures
on the last factor. There were no significant main effects
of group, recording phase, or the group by phase inter-
action for the number of thoughts. However, the ANOVA
on the number of IAMs revealed a significant main effect
of recording phase (F(1, 53) = 18.00, p < .001, η2 = .25),
with participants recording lower number of IAMs in the
second phase compared to the first phase. However,
neither the main effect of group, nor the group by phase
interaction were significant (Fs < 1). To check for repetitive
entries, the mean number of memories that had been
recorded during the second phase for the first time or
more times were entered into independent t-test. The
groups did not differ in the number of memories that
were written down for the first time (control M = 1.27,
SD = 1.04, high school M = 1.28, SD = 1.13; t(53) = .02,
p = .98, d = .00), or more times (control M = .12, SD = .59,
high school M = .10, SD = .31; t(53) = .09, p = .93, d = .00).9
Effects of priming: Recall of IAMs from different
lifetime periods
Table 2 shows the mean IMD indexes for each of the life
time periods such as primary school, middle school, high
school, college and after college. No memories were
recalled for early childhood covering periods of kindergar-
ten and before kindergarten. Consequently, means for
these periods are absent from the table. The mean IMD
index for each lifetime period were entered into a 2
group (control, high school) × 2 collecting phase (phase
1, phase 2) mixed ANOVA with the repeated measure on
the last factor.10 There were no significant main effects,
recording phase or the group by phase interaction for
the mean IMD indexes for primary school, middle school,
college and after college periods.
However, the results revealed a significant main effect of
group for the high school IMD index. As predicted (see Table
2), the high school group had a higher IMD index related to
the lifetime period of high school compared to the control
group (F(1, 33) = 4.95, p = .033, η2 = .13). The main effect of
recording phase was not significant (F < 1). In addition, we
observed a significant group by phase interaction, F(1, 33)
= 4.62, p = .039, η2 = .12. While there was no effect of con-
dition in phase 1 (p = .84), the experimental group signifi-
cantly differed from the control group in phase 2. More
specifically, post hoc tests indicated that the frequency of
memories related to the high school lifetime period
recorded in the second phase was significantly higher in
the high school group than in the control group (p = .003,
η2 = .22). At the same time, the difference between the
first and second phase in the high school group was
approaching statistical significance (p = .087, η2 = .11) with
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for variables measuring number of
thoughts, memories and IMD index.
Group
High school Control
M SD M SD
Number of thoughts_1 17.90 19.23 20.70 18.20
Number of thoughts_2 15.38 12.47 19.11 15.49
Number of memories_1 3.31 3.36 3.31 3.45
Number of memories_2 1.38 1.15 1.38 1.06
Retrieval time_1 2.43 1.05 2.52 0.91
Retrieval time_2 3.43 2.29 3.27 1.52
Specificity_1 .66 .35 .62 .33
Specificity_2 .43 .44 .75 .35
Before kindergarten – – – –
Kindergarten – – – –
Primary school IMD index_1 .10 .17 .08 .24
Primary school IMD index_2 .12 .23 .09 .26
Middle school IMD index_1 .02 .04 .07 .24
Middle school IMD index_2 .07 .24 .02 .08
High school IMD index_1 .14 .25 .15 .30
High school IMD index_2 .311 .40 .021 .08
College IMD index_1 .66 .33 .63 .41
College IMD index_2 .46 .40 .74 .44
After college IMD index_1 .06 .24 .05 .15
After college IMD index_2 .06 .24 .14 .31
Remote past IMD index_1 .11a .24 .21 .38
Remote past IMD index_2 .51a,1 .42 .131 .27
The age of the memory_1 19.22 2.93 20.46 3.32
The age of the memory_2 18.69 2.47 21.20 2.08
Notes: While means with the same numerical subscripts (e.g., 1,2) are signifi-
cantly different between columns, means with the same literal subscripts
(e.g., a,b) are significantly different between rows. Please note that each
index is the proportion of memories from a certain period in all IAMs
reported by the individual.
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medium effect size, but there was no difference between
these two phases in the control group (p = .21).
Effects of priming: recall of remote IAMs
While the main effect of group on the remote past IMD
index was not significant (p = .10), we observed significant
effect of collecting phase (F(1, 33) = 4.14, p = .050, η2 = .11)
with memories from the remote past being reported more
often during the second phase compared to the first phase.
However, this main effect was qualified by the significant
group by phase interaction (F(1, 33) = 9.76, p = .004,
η2 = .23). Post hoc tests revealed that participants in the
high school group experienced memories from remote
past more often in phase 2 compared to phase 1
(p = .001, η2 = .39), but there were no differences
between these two phases in the control group (p = .45).
In addition, while there was no effect of condition in
phase 1 (p = .38), in phase 2 the remote past IMD index
was higher in the high school group compared to the
control group (p = .001, η2 = .29).
The age of recorded memories
In addition to assigning their past memories to certain life
time periods, participants also indicated how old they were
when the event in memory took place. The overall mean
ages of recorded IAMs were entered into a 2 (group:
control, high school) × 2 (collecting phase: first phase,
second phase) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on
the last factor. The main effect of group was significant (F
(1, 30) = 5.47, p = .026, η2 = .15). Memories recorded in
the control group were rated as significantly more recent
(M = 20.83, SD = 2.07) compared to the high school group
(M = 18.95, SD = 2.07). At the same time, the effect of
phase and the group by phase interaction were not signifi-
cant (p = 26). Since we hypothesised that memories
recorded during second phase should be more remote in
high school group compared to the control group, for
exploratory purposes we run planned comparisons. As
expected, memories recorded during the second phase
were older in the high school group compared to the
control group (p = .005, η2 = .27).
Additional findings
Cue analysis
In both groups, the majority of memories had identifiable
cues (95% in the control and 97% in the high school con-
dition). Analysis of cue type showed that while 82% of
cues in the control group (86% in phase 1 and 74% in
phase 2) and 76% of cues in the high school group (78%
in phase 1 and 69% in phase 2) were reported as being trig-
gered by word cues on the screen, only 0.75% of memories
in the control group and 6% of memories in the high
school group were reported as being triggered by stimuli
in the surrounding environment. Similarly, the number of
memories triggered by internal thoughts was only 11% in
the control group (10% in phase 1 and 15% in phase 2)
and 15% in the high school group (12.50% in phase 1
and 21% in phase 2). Finally, in both groups very few mem-
ories were reported to have no triggers (5% in the control
and 3% in the high school groups).
RT of IAMs
The mean RT of IAMs (see Table 2) were entered into a 2
(group: control, high school) × 2 (collecting phase: first
phase, second phase) mixed ANOVA with repeated
measures on the last factor. There were no significant
main effects of group (p = .95), recording phase (p = .07)
or the group by phase interaction (p = .79).
The specificity of remembered IAMs
We entered the mean specificity ratio (i.e., the proportion
of specific relative to the total amount of memories) into
a 2 (group: control, high school) × 2 (collecting phase:
first phase, second phase) mixed ANOVA with repeated
measures on the last factor. While there were no significant
main effects of group (p = .13) and recording phase (p
= .55), the group by phase interaction was significant, F(1,
32) = 4.28, p < . 047, η2 = .12. The only significant difference
was observed in the second phase between the control
and the high school group (p = .013, η2 = .15). As it can
be seen in Table 2, the specificity ratio in the second
phase was significantly lower in the high school group
compared to the control group. At the same time, the
difference in this regard between the first phase and
second phase in the high school group was close to statisti-
cal significance (p = .06, η2 = .18).
General discussion
We examined the effect of priming on IAMs using the
experimental procedure that allows studying IAMs under
well-controlled conditions. We used a design in which par-
ticipants were or were not engaged in the voluntary
remembering before the second IAM collecting phase.
This allowed us to manipulate the priming mechanism
between-subject (participants who were engaged in volun-
tary remembering vs. those who were not) and within-
subject (differences between the first and the second
IAM collecting phase). We examined the IMD index for
each lifetime period. For example, the high school IMD
index represented the proportion of IAMs from the time
of high school (ages 16–19) out of all the memories
reported by the participant. We hypothesised that the fre-
quency of IAMs from the period of high school, as
measured by the IMD index, would increase after voluntary
retrieval of memories from that period. In addition, we
expected to observe higher frequency of remote IAMs
after voluntary retrieval of remote personal past. Impor-
tantly, by using a fully computerised experimental pro-
cedure we were able, on one hand, to carefully control
the context of IAM occurrence (e.g., triggers, ongoing
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cognitive activity). On the other hand, and even more
importantly, we were able to more directly analyse the
RT of IAMs (as in Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).
In line with our predictions, we observed the priming
effect on IAMs with participants who were reminiscing
about the high school period for 15 min reporting signifi-
cantly higher number of IAMs from the high school
period during the second IAM collecting phase than the
control participants. This finding clearly suggests that
retrieving memories from a particular period of one’s per-
sonal past, may influence memories that spontaneously
come to mind afterwards. We also observed the enhanced
tendency to involuntarily retrieve more remote IAMs after
reminiscing about the distant past. More specifically, just
after reminiscing about the high school, participants experi-
enced more frequently remote IAMs in the high school
group compared to the group that did not reminiscence
about anything (between-subject differences) and com-
pared to the involuntary IAM collection phase that was
not preceded by reminiscing (within-subject differences).
First, our findings support the main conclusions pro-
vided by Mace (2005). More specifically, we lend additional
empirical evidence to the notion that cognitive activity in
general, and the reminiscence-type activity in particular,
may change the involuntary retrieval and enhance or
attenuate the tendency to experience more or less
distant personal past. Therefore, priming may play a role
in the IAMs retrieval not only by activating thematically
related memories, as it was shown in Study 2 by Mace
(2005), but also by activating memories pertaining to a
more broad period of time. It appears that this novel
priming effect on memories from the remote past demon-
strates more indirect effect of priming on involuntary
memory retrieval, which is in line with the model proposed
by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000). More precisely, as it
was observed in the present study, talking about the past
(presumably) activated particular levels and nodes in the
autobiographical knowledge base, and this activation
then spread further throughout the network, increasing
the level of activation of more remote memory nodes,
which facilitated the future processing of such memory
information. As a result, it was more likely for participants
in the high school group to retrieve an IAM relating to
more distant than recent past compared to control partici-
pants. As IAMs usually pertain to most recent past (e.g.,
Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Vannucci et al.,
2014), it can be argued that it is because they are retrieved
from the parts of autobiographical knowledge that were
most activated at the moment of retrieval. However, as it
was demonstrated in our study, the level of activation
may be modified, and therefore, the tendency to retrieve
IAMs relating to recent past (e.g., college time for under-
graduate students) may be reversed.
It is reasonable to ask to what extent the level of acti-
vation remains relatively constant over time. For
example, this finding also lends some partial support to
the idea that IAMs may be influenced and primed by, for
example, preoccupations over one’s long-term life situ-
ation (Berntsen, 2007). According to Berntsen (2007; see
also Mace, 2007) the retrieval of IAMs in everyday life
may be influenced by long-term dispositions, such as moti-
vational factors. For instance, an orientation towards indi-
vidual’s goals and expectations may chronically prime a
certain subclass of autobiographical memories, which, as
a result, are much easier to be elicited involuntarily by inci-
dental cues. While this idea has not yet been addressed, it
is clearly an interesting avenue for further research.
As in previous studies (e.g., Mace, 2005; Schlagman &
Kvavilashvili, 2008; Vannucci et al., 2014), most memories
retrieved by participants in both groups were elicited by
external rather than internal cues. For this reason, it is
reasonable to ask to what extent the priming effects and
cues interact with each other. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, since the triggers usually do not match only to
one event, priming may enhance a cue-item discriminabil-
ity. However, whether the memory will be retrieved or not
still depends on the strength of the cue-memory associ-
ation that may modify the efficacy of priming processes.
For example, when the high school and control groups
are compared, we would expect to observe more mem-
ories from the primed period in response to phrases
strongly relating to this period (e.g., biology test, research
school project) in the former group. In addition, one
would expect that primed memories, in general, and mem-
ories elicited by the period-specific cues, in particular,
would be faster elicited. However, in our study we did
not observe the differences between groups and phases
in terms of the speed of IAMs retrieval (although the
main effect of the phase was close to the statistical signifi-
cance, p = .071, with memories slightly slower retrieved
during phase 1 compared to phase 2). Yet, the RT for the
IAMs (below 2.5 s in the first phases and between 3.27
and 3.43 s in the second phases) correspond very closely
to the latencies reported in earlier studies that used differ-
ent experimental procedures and paradigms (Berntsen
et al., 2013; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; Staugaard &
Berntsen, 2014), which additionally supports the validity
and reliability of our experimental design. It is worth to
underline that in our study we did not manipulate the
type of triggers used (e.g., the extent to which they relate
exclusively to the high school time). Thus, word phrases
were not strongly associated with the primed lifetime
period. However, such association might speed up the
retrieval of IAMs. Clearly, the possible interplay between
priming and triggers in the retrieval of IAMs is an interest-
ing avenue for future research.
Second, as Mace (2005) suggested, since priming mech-
anism may be one of at least few controlling factors for the
flow and selection of IAMs, by narrowing or broadening the
pool of pre-activated memories, we may increase or
decrease the likelihood of retrieving either thematically
or temporally relating memories. This may have important
implications for developing our understating of intrusive
memories that are typical for post-traumatic stress disorder
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(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; see Mace, 2005 for
a similar argument). For instance, intrusive memories may
continuously prime all type of mental contents resulting
in recurrent experiencing of trauma memories in the suf-
ferers of post-traumatic stress disorder. It addition,
priming mechanism may also affect the type of retrieved
memories. In our study, it was unexpectedly manifested
in the second phase by the lower specificity ratio in the
high school group compared to the control group and
the difference in the specificity ratio between the first
and second phase in the high school group. As it can be
seen in Table 2, after priming participants retrieved less
specific memories compared to the phase before
priming. Put differently, participants were more prone to
retrieve memories of general events from the past (e.g.,
going out with school friends) after reminiscing about
the past than before the voluntary remembering session.
It is possible that voluntary reminiscing caused pre-acti-
vation of higher levels of memory information to more
extent compared to lower levels. Therefore, more general
memories were easier to retrieve in response to a cue.
Although this novel finding requires further investigation,
it already suggests that priming may, at least on some
occasions, enhance the retrieval of more general memories
than it might be expected.
Possible limitations and alternative explanations
When discussing the present results some limitations of
our design should be considered. First, it may be
argued that participants might be more willing to
report having a memory relating to the retrieved period
because, for example, they might think that the exper-
imenter is especially interested in such memories. To
avoid this risk, we assured all participants that these
two parts had nothing in common and should not be
treated as interrelated. In addition, all participants
answered open-ended questions concerning what they
thought was the true goal of the study. As reported in
the results section, none of the participants reported
having guessed the true relation between the voluntary
memory recording phase and the IAM colleting phase.
Importantly, had they guessed the true relation, we
would have expected to observe more memories in the
high school group compared to the control group in
the second phase. Yet, the lack of group differences in
this regard speaks against such an alternative expla-
nation. Participants were not more inclined to record
involuntary thoughts or memories after the voluntary
memory recording phase compared to the control
group. Importantly, by instructing them to write down
any type of mental content we also avoided placing the
focus of attention on retrieval of IAMs.
Second, it may be argued that participants were likely to
engage in the voluntary retrieval of autobiographical mem-
ories during the IAM colleting phase. However, in order to
minimise plausible voluntary retrieval during the IAM
collecting phase, participants were instructed to report
any spontaneously occurring thoughts without putting
any emphasis on memories (see also Barzykowski et al.,
2016; Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016; Vannucci et al.,
2014, for the same procedure). As it was shown in a
recent study by Barzykowski et al. (2016), this procedure
is effective in minimising the frequency of voluntary mem-
ories retrieved during the IAM collecting phase.
Third, elaborating further on the possibility that IAMs
were the product of an intentional retrieval, Mace (2005)
inspected the pattern of cues triggering IAMs. He argued
that the low level of internal cues and the high level of
external triggers made it less likely that participants volun-
tarily tried to retrieve memories. If it was the case, we
would expect to observe more memories triggered by
thoughts compared to external cues words presented in
the vigilance task. Yet, similar to previous studies (e.g.,
Mace, 2005; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; Vannucci
et al., 2014) most cues identified by participants in our
study were external words. Finally, the examination of
retrieval times of IAMs provides further support for the
idea that memories were recalled involuntarily. In particu-
lar, in previous studies voluntary memories were retrieved
at fastest in 6108 s (Berntsen et al., 2013, Study 2; see also
Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili,
2008), while retrieval times observed in our study ranged
from 2.43 to 3.43 s. We therefore argue that given some-
what low percentage of memories with internal thought-
based triggers (range between 10% and 21% compared
to 19% reported by Mace in Study 2), high percentage of
external (word-based) triggers (range between 69% and
86%), low retrieval times, as well as the responses to
post-task survey, it is rather unlikely that the results were
affected by intentional retrieval.
Fourth, one may argue that using verbal cues might in
general attenuate the priming effect, especially because
they were not highly personalised as they usually are in
everyday life. In addition, since participants were provided
with the same sets of cues twice, the priming effect might
be especially suppressed. For these reasons, future studies
should ideally use different sets of cues that will be at the
same time idiosyncratic and individually tailored to each
participant. Fifth, as was suggested by Mace (2005), invo-
luntary retrieval may occur minutes, hours or even days
after priming. As we studied participants’ cognitive activity
during relatively short period of time, we may expect to
observe more primed memories outside the laboratory
after the experiment. This would be in accordance with
Mace’s findings (2005) showing that most of primed mem-
ories were collected a day or a few days after voluntary
memory recording session. For this reason, future studies
may be extended by a diary phase that would follow the
laboratory session. It should be stressed, however, that
despite potential shortcomings of our procedure that
were discussed above, we did demonstrate the priming
effect on IAMs and these shortcomings only suggest that
the priming effect may be stronger than the one we found.
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Finally, it can be argued that providing participants with
the same set of verbal phrases during the second IAM col-
leting phase might have caused the interference between
IAMs retrieved during the first phase and newly primed
IAMs during the second phase. Such competition might
have reduced the effect of priming, especially since a list
of cues was relatively short. This may be the reason for rela-
tively low amount of IAMs observed in the second IAM
phase and for the within-subject priming effect that only
approached statistical significance. Future studies should
control for this possible limitations, by providing partici-
pants with longer, and even more importantly, different
sets of cues during the first and second IAM phase. This
may boost the effect of priming on IAMs.
Final conclusions
While we used a shorter and weaker manipulation of
priming than was used by Mace (2005) (i.e., 12–15 min
vs. 30 min of voluntary recall), we were still able to
observe a significant priming effect in the involuntary
memory retrieval. Our findings demonstrate that retrieving
voluntary memories from the past may facilitate the acti-
vation of IAMs related to the same period of time. In
addition, remembering personal past may enhance the
tendency to experience more remote IAMs. Our study sup-
ports the idea that IAMs may rely, to some extent, on the
priming effect and spreading activation mechanism. The
findings suggest that IAMs can be considered as a
product of organised cognitive processes rather than
random and chaotic cognitive activity.
Notes
1. Please note that throughout the paper these phases are also
called the first or the second involuntary memory (IAM) collect-
ing phase.
2. Throughout the paper this phase is also called the voluntary
memory recording phase.
3. Please note that since most participants in the present study
were undergraduate students, the college time and after
college time relate either to their present or most recent
past, while periods before the high school time relate rather
to the remote past.
4. The Polish adaptation of verbal phrases is described in detail
elsewhere (Barzykowski et al., 2016, p. 6).
5. Please note that we used the same set of cues during the first
and second phase to be sure that the possible differences
between the first and second phase were due to the manipu-
lation used rather than to the differences between cues.
6. It measures the strength of negative and positive emotions and
consists of 30 items measuring current emotional states. Par-
ticipants have to rate on a 5-point scale to what extent the
given adjectives correspond with their current state. The
reliability coefficients (internal consistency and stability) for
the questionnaire equalled .73–.95. It was applied in order to
control for comparability of studied groups. For example, it is
possible that voluntarily reminiscing about high school
period may somehow affect participants’ mood.
7. Please note that by employing two practise sessions we were
able to sequentially provide participants with crucial elements
of the procedure (i.e., vigilance task instruction and involuntary
thought recording instruction) followed by a relevant practise
session.
8. The voluntary memory recording module in the high school
group took, on average, 12.94 minutes (SD = 4.22).
9. Please note that participants knew that they would do the vig-
ilance task twice and, therefore, the repetition of cue-words
was something understandable and expected to them. To
our best knowledge, participants did not pay any special atten-
tion to the repetition of verbal cues and they were not sur-
prised by its occurrence.
10. Please note that in order to examine the effects of priming it
was necessitated to include into the mixed ANOVAs reported
below only participants that had at least one memory reported
in both phase 1 and 2. Therefore the total number of valid par-
ticipants was 35 (17 in the control group and 18 in the high
school condition).
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